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D7fdles1 Trial UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, New York, N.Y. 4 S14 11 Cr. 1091 (VM) V. PETER LESNIEWSKI, MARIE BARAN 5 and JOSEPH RUTIGLIANO, 6 Defendants. 7 -----X 8 9 July 15, 2013 9:30 a.m. 10 11 Before: 12 HON. VICTOR MARRERO, 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 BY: JUSTIN S. WEDDLE DANIEL BEN TEHRANI NICOLE WARE FRIEDLANDER 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 19 LAW OFFICES OF JOSHUA L. DRATEL, P.C. 20 Attorneys for Defendant Peter Lesniewski BY: JOSHUA LEWIS DRATEL 21 LINDSAY A. LEWIS 22 DURKIN & ROBERTS Attorneys for Defendant Peter Lesniewski 23 BY: THOMAS ANTHONY DURKIN 24 25

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D7fdles1 Trial APPEARANCES CONTINUED KOEHLER & ISAACS, LLP Attorneys for Defendant Marie Baran BY: JOEY JACKSON JOSEPH W. RYAN, JR. KEVIN MENEILLY Attorneys for Defendant Joseph Rutigliano - also present -Annie Chen Emma Larson, Government Paralegals SA Frank LoMonaco, FBI Yeni Yrizarry, Defendant Baran Paralegal

Trial THE COURT: Good morning. You may be seated. 1 2 This is a proceeding in the matter the United States 3 v. Lesniewski and others, docket number 11 Cr. 1091, and it is scheduled as the commencement of the trial of the defendants 4 5 remaining in this matter. 6 Counsel, please enter your appearances for the record. 7 MR. WEDDLE: Good morning, your Honor. Justin Weddle for the United States. I'm here with Daniel Tehrani and Nicole 8 9 Friedlander, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and next to 10 Ms. Friedlander is Emma Larson and then Annie Chen, paralegals 11 in our office, and Special Agent Frank LoMonaco. 12 THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you. Welcome. 13 MR. DURKIN: Good morning, Judge. Thomas Durkin on 14 behalf of Dr. Lesniewski. Along with me is Joshua Dratel and Lindsay Lewis from Mr. Dratel's office. 15 MR. DRATEL: Good morning, your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 MS. LEWIS: Good morning, your Honor. 19 MR. JACKSON: Judge, it's pleasant. Good morning to 20 Joey Jackson representing Ms. Baran. I also have 21 Ms. Yeni Yrizarry, our paralegal. 22 THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. RYAN: Good morning, your Honor. Joe Ryan for Joe Rutigliano and Kevin Meneilly.

MR. MENEILLY: Good morning, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you. Welcome.

All right. The jury pool will probably not be here for, I would say, at least an hour, so we have some time to go over whatever major issues remain and additional housekeeping matters.

The Court issued its rulings on the various motions in limine on Friday. Since then the Court has received an additional motion from Mr. Rutigliano dealing with the golf video issue.

The Court also has received from Mr. Lesniewski a motion for reconsideration and/or reargument relating to the Court's ruling on the government's motion to preclude certain portions of the testimony of the expert proposed by Dr. Lesniewski.

The Court has also received correspondence from the government dated July 11th, which it is making available to the Court and copies to the defendants certain material that it classifies as 3500 or particular material pertaining to one of the issues that the Court ruled upon in the motions in limine.

So we can address some of these matters at this point. Some of them may or may not be immediate. For example, the matter of the testimony of the government's expert regarding — or I should say Dr. Lesniewski's expert may not be something immediate unless there is something about that issue that needs to be addressed at this point. We can take a greater amount of

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time for the parties to review the submission from Dr. Lesniewski; otherwise, we can deal with it at a sooner time, if it is necessary.

Let me first ask the government whether it received the submission from Mr. Rutigliano and Dr. Lesniewski?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor. We received the submission --

MR. JACKSON: Judge, I'm sorry. I don't mean to interrupt.

Excuse me, Mr. Weddle.

Judge, my client does have a slight hearing problem, and your microphone, Judge, is not up that loudly. I was wondering if there was any possibility --

THE COURT: Let me see if I can turn on the microphone. It may be off.

MR. JACKSON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: I will just speak a little louder.

Yes, Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: Sorry, your Honor. We received the filings that your Honor mentioned.

The motion by Mr. Rutigliano is to preclude evidence relating to golf on the grounds that it is irrelevant. I think that it is completely obvious that the defendant's ability to play golf is highly relevant when he claimed disability based on things like his inability to grip tools and to walk on an

uneven ground and other things. I don't have his filing in front of me, but I think that that motion is really something that should be denied out of hand. If your Honor would like a written response, we are happy to do that.

THE COURT: No. We don't need any further argumentation in writing on that matter.

MR. WEDDLE: The motion to reconsider, you know, I think that there is nothing new in it. So I can go through — I mean, as I was reading it, I noted some items that I think are wrong and are quite easily explained. We could do that now or we could do that at a future time or we could do that in writing; whatever your Honor's preference is we are happy to do.

THE COURT: If it is not urgent, if it is not something that is going to come up today, for example, during the opening statements, we could put it off, give you more time to review the matter and respond in writing, if necessary.

One issue that I noted the motion stresses is the argument that the government underestimated the qualifications of Dr. Freeman insofar as his experience in reviewing disability claims as a consultant to the SSI program and in the Navy's. That may be an issue that you may want to address in further submissions.

MR. WEDDLE: I can address that in 30 seconds right now, your Honor, and I can further address it in writing as

well. But the primary thing that they point to for the relevance of Dr. Freeman's experience with Social Security claims is that it has to do with Social Security listings, and I know what those are. But basically there are lists of certain impairments that render somebody, by definition, disabled under Social Security rules, and under certain circumstances those same rules are applied by the Railroad Retirement Board.

None of the cases that we're going to be talking about are cases involving the lists. And in fact, the example given by defense counsel in their brief says that there are documents that are produced in discovery, called disability briefing documents, that talk about a sequential evaluation, and one of the items on the list when a claims examiner is going through the evaluation is they ask does the impairment meet or equal the listing of impairments. The answer to that is always no, and then they go into a different analysis which is basically a case by case analysis. They call it independent case evaluation, or ICE for short, but it basically involves looking at the person's conditions and determining whether that person is unable to do his or her railroad job.

The listings are things like if you have -- I'm just making this up, but it is the type of thing where it would say if you have stage-three lung cancer, you are disabled. It has nothing to do with your capabilities, it's just on a list. I

don't know if that is one of them, but I think that that's the type of thing that is on the list. Whereas the evaluation in this case, and the only decisions that are at issue in this case, are evaluations of whether the person's conditions impair them such that they can't do their job. So it is not just a definitional you have this diagnosis at this level of severity, therefore you are disabled, which is what the lists are about. It's much more functional.

So this example that they give doesn't change the analysis at all because we're not going to be dealing with the world of Social Security's listed impairments except to say that they don't apply.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Weddle, why don't we put this issue off for the moment. It is likely to take up more time than we have this morning to deal with other more important -- more pressing matters.

Anything else on your end?

MR. WEDDLE: I had a few housekeeping type items that I thought I would raise, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEDDLE: The most basic one is just to inquire what your Honor -- what the trial schedule would look like. I read your Honor's individual practices, which indicate a five-day week from 9 to 5 with certain breaks, but I just wondered if your Honor was planning to keep to that schedule or

alter it in this case.

THE COURT: We are going to more or less stick with it. As you are aware, we have a long trial and at a very inconvenient time for a lot of people in the middle of the summer. So we need to do everything possible to make up as much time as we can.

Consequently, we will try to go as much as possible 9 to 5 every day except on Fridays. We may need to meet only in the morning on Friday in order to allow the Court to handle other important matters in the afternoon such as sentencings and pleas and matters of that kind, and that may or may not apply to all Fridays, but at least initially we will not meet on August 9th. I have another commitment on that day. If there are times in which matters are pressing and we need to move more expeditiously and get more in, I will work out a schedule under which instead of ending at 5 we can go until 6 depending on the availability of court reporters. But we will have to adjust the schedule as we go along and as we get a better sense of whether or not we are going to be able to conclude within the time allotted.

Now, there is another matter that may help in gaining at least as much as a day or a half a day, which is the jury selection process, and we will get to that in a moment.

OK. Anything else?

MR. WEDDLE: Maybe it would be helpful if I just read

out the items that are on my list and then we can take them up if your Honor would like.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEDDLE: I had a couple of things to say about jury selection, a couple of additional questions that we thought might be useful to add, although your Honor may well have covered them in your Honor's list of questions.

We had a few names that we thought perhaps should be added to the list of names.

I also wanted to talk about our witness list, which relates to stipulations.

I wanted to say something about the Court's initial instructions to the jury describing the case. I think it is very minor.

And if we have time this morning, it might be useful to raise — just to give your Honor some background about an issue that may arise in the future in the trial relating to certain exhibits that we've marked for identification but we are not planning to offer the entirety of it, and I am just going to explain how we have marked them to your Honor so that if this issue comes up later in the trial, you will understand the context in which it is coming up. We are not asking for a ruling now.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEDDLE: Those are the items and I can talk

further about any one of them.

THE COURT: The question of names, if you -- we have not yet made the final list of names and witness lists of the people whose identities should be disclosed to the jury. So if you have any such names or people to enter the witness list, just give it to my law clerks and we will make a composite list later on. The same thing for the defendants. If they have any names who should be disclosed, please hand those up during the break that we will be taking before the jury pool comes in.

With regards to stipulations --

MR. WEDDLE: We are still working on them, your Honor. We've now -- well, I am not sure but I think that we've reached a few. I think that there are several more that we're still conferring about. I'm optimistic that we are going to reach stipulations on essentially all of those issues. It does look like there are a couple where defense counsel made clear they don't want to stipulate on this issue, they want to have a witness. So we may have to add a couple of witnesses to our list that we were hoping to do by stipulation. And I can't make a promise with respect to the other stipulations, but I don't want to be overly pessimistic either and say that we need to add ten witnesses to our list because I do think we are going to reach stipulations on many of the outstanding ones.

So that's on stipulations.

THE COURT: All right. Now, with regards to

description of the case, you have something else that you wish to add?

MR. WEDDLE: The only thing that I was going to raise on that issue, your Honor, is I'm not sure how your Honor was going to do it, and, actually, standing here right now, I've forgotten how we wrote it up. But I was going to suggest that rather than listing for the jury the number of counts involved and, you know, Count Five through 12 are this, that we just leave that a little bit less defined. And the purpose for that, your Honor, is that depending on how the evidence is coming in, the government might decide to streamline the case and just say, you know what, we're not going to call that witness, which means we are going to drop this substantive count.

The problem is we would have a disincentive to do that if the jury has been told there are 33 counts in the indictment. Then the jury might wonder what happened to some of the counts. I don't think they need to know at the beginning of the case that there are 33 counts. I think that your Honor could just say those are conspiracy counts, there are a number of substantive healthcare fraud counts, if your Honor was planning to describe the indictment in that kind of detail at all. But if your Honor is, I would just suggest that we not give them count numbers and then we retain some flexibility without having that disincentive.

THE COURT: The easiest thing to do, Mr. Weddle, is to have you prepare what you think would be an acceptable summary that addresses your concern. I also would not want to prolong the amount of detail count by count of all of the charges. It is simpler to summarize. So if you could come forward with a summary, show it to defense counsel, and if you all agree then we will go with that.

MR. WEDDLE: I will, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, with regards to exhibits?

MR. WEDDLE: So the context that I would like to explain to your Honor is there are a number of exhibits that are entire files that have been marked as government exhibits. And I think it's Government Exhibit 100 to 162, or something in that area, are claim files from the Railroad Retirement Board. And then there is a similar context with respect to patient files that come from doctors' offices. Those are in the 300 series of exhibits. We've marked them as exhibits but we don't plan to offer the file as a whole, you know, for a number of reasons.

But there are situations where the fact that a document comes from an RRB claim file has evidentiary value, and there are situations where the fact that the document comes from the doctor's office file has evidentiary value. So what we plan to do is just have them marked for identification and then not offer them, but then a person could testify, you know,

I looked in Government Exhibit 101, which is the claim file, and this document comes from the claim file. In fact, that is a bad example because with respect to the claim files I think we are going to reach a stipulation that is going to cover all excerpts from the claim file for that purpose, just for authentication purposes, that anything numbered in a certain way means that it is an excerpt from the claim file.

Now, in talking to some of the defense counsel, they may take the position — I don't want to speak for them, but the indication I have gotten is that certain defense counsel may take the position that the entire file should just be admitted every time, and we disagree with that position. But we just didn't want there to be confusion in the way that we've put government exhibit stickers on documents. We just put it there for identification and it doesn't mean that we plan to offer it.

And within the file there are any number of different documents, and they would have -- depending on for what purpose they were being offered, there might be different questions about their admissibility.

And just with respect to the claim files, there is an additional issue which is those claims files include the documents that relate to the continuing disability reviews, which your Honor has already excluded. So with respect to the claim files, at least it's clear that they can't be admitted in

their entirety. But we just wanted to give your Honor that context, and then so your Honor knows when we're offering documents that we are offering them as excerpts and that there may come a time when we would have a witness say this document, which has been offered in evidence, comes from, you know, Government Exhibit 303, which is the patient file from the medical office, which wouldn't require offering into evidence Government Exhibit 303.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks you.

MR. DURKIN: Judge, I think --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DURKIN: I think I could expedite that.

The only thing we're concerned about is that we would simply like the right to take an excerpt ourselves from that file, from the bigger file, and obviously if it is something that is excluded, then we can argue about that. But insofar as -- as long as it is OK if the whole -- let's say the whole claim file for the particular individual, if the government wants to do excerpts, we may want the same privilege to be able to take a different document and use it. And I think we are in agreement on that, if I am not mistaken.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, is there any disagreement with that, as long as there is a basis and a foundation for the defendants' use of someone else?

MR. WEDDLE: We are not going to quibble and say it is

not from the claim file if it is from the file or from the doctor file, but we may have an argument about the admissibility depending on the purpose for which they are offering it. I think we are in total agreement on this.

THE COURT: That is fine.

MR. RYAN: Sorry to interrupt, your Honor. I have a different view. I don't believe that cherrypicking from the RRB claim should be allowed. The whole claim file is the whole picture of the process that these claims were submitted. It has in detail the disability decision, the examiner gives specific reasons for granting the application, and that's going to be the bedrock of our defense. This was an honest, open, well-known system, and the whole file reflects that. And that the idea that you could pick out one document and not let the jury evaluate that document the way the RRB evaluated it is the most critical part of this case. So we object to that, Judge.

And I think your Honor would be in a better position to rule on these things as the trial proceeds than doing it now in advance.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, just to be clear, I don't want to fill up the courtroom with words but I absolutely echo
Mr. Ryan's sentiment in that regard.

THE COURT: All right. We'll hold determination on that issue until a later point.

All right. Anything else from the government?

Trial 1 MR. WEDDLE: No, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else from defense 3 counsel? 4 MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, just in terms of 5 housekeeping. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. DRATEL: Is it OK with the Court if, let's say, on a particular -- there may be a morning session or a day where 8 9 one of us, either Mr. Durkin or myself might not be here, we 10 might be out doing something else on the case or doing something else, if we let the Court know in advance -- it would 11 12 not be obviously in a way that would delay the trial. We would 13 be prepared to do it at a time that we knew that particular 14 person who might be absent that day was not needed for a 15 variety of reasons, but if that is OK with the Court? 16 THE COURT: As long as you get a note from your 17 client. 18 MR. DRATEL: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 19 MR. DURKIN: Judge, in that regard, we may have 20 mentioned this before. I have a matter in Chicago on the 21 23rd that Dr. Lesniewski has agreed to permit me to go back to 22 attend to. So I will not be here on July 23rd. 23 THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Ryan.

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MR. RYAN: Your Honor, we did submit a proposed voir

dire submission of July 9. If it is not in the Court file, we will give you our copy of what we have. It has all the names and suggested questions and suggested concern about addressing the jury's adversity to sitting during the summer and the length of this trial. I just wanted to call it to your Honor's attention.

THE COURT: I don't have -- why don't you hand it up.

MR. RYAN: Sure.

(Handing)

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MR. RYAN: Thank you.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, does the government have the submission as to which Mr. Ryan relates?

MR. WEDDLE: I confess, your Honor, I don't have it in any of the many binders I brought with me today. I think I remember seeing it, but I am sorry that I don't have it with me. I may be able to run down -- can we pull it up on the computer?

(Pause)

I can run down and get it.

THE COURT: It is not critical at this moment.

(Pause)

THE COURT: All right. We have a list of names submitted by Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan, what is the nature of this list of names?

Are they individuals who are going to be referred to in some form during the course of the trial?

MR. RYAN: Yes. They are either workers from the Long Island Railroad, consultants. I've tried to include unions. They will be referred to during the course of the trial, Judge.

THE COURT: All right.

Anything else from defense counsel?

MR. RYAN: Judge, we have three defendants here, and may I respectfully request that we be given an additional three peremptory challenges?

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: Your Honor, I don't think it is necessary. I think the defense already has ten challenges compared with the government's six. So they already have four additional challenges beyond what the government has. Then they appear to have similar issues and defenses in the case. So I don't think it is necessary in this case to increase the number of peremptory challenges.

MR. RYAN: Your Honor, I think this exchange today shows that we are not on line. For example, this discussion about consenting to just portions of the RRB file, as opposed to our position that the whole file should be available to the jury, is one example. We have a doctor who the government is going to claim is fabricating evidence of medical condition, and we have his client, patient, Mr. Rutigliano. So we have --

then we have Marie Baran, who actually worked for the RRB, and until she retired she was working on the government's side of this issue. So we have different statuses of different defendants, and there is going to be a confluence of interests that may conflict and add to our need to have additional rights to exercise peremptory challenges.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ryan, one possible implication of having extra peremptory challenges, on the other side of the coin, is that we have a larger pool from which to exercise challenges. We already have a difficult time in trying to put together a list of jurors at this time of year for a complicated trial. Instead of 32, if we had to have, let's say, 35 in the initial pool, it would mean essentially prolonging and making it more complex for us to reach 35 rather than 32.

I think that with the ten and six breakdown that is traditional in this courtroom even for multiple defendant trials, the defense should have sufficient peremptories and you simply have to work that out among yourselves.

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Continued on next page)

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DRATEL: We join obviously Mr. Ryan's request. In addition, one other reason I think is because of the persistent publicity in this case, which has not been favorable to the defense at all, it's really been one sided in that regard, so those additional challenges will enable us I think to have a fair jury.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

While we are on the question of selecting a jury, let me raise a concern that I alluded to earlier, which is still a considerable issue. We requested an initial pool of 100, from which we need to have a venire of at least 32 in order to enable us to have a jury of 12 regular jurors and two alternates. It is a significant challenge at this time of year to find that number of jurors available for a trial that is to last through most likely through the balance of the summer.

We have seen it in other courtrooms already where judges are having a difficult time finding a considerable number of jurors at this time.

One possibility that I suggest for you to think about as a way of expediting our ability to find a suitable jury as expeditiously as possible is to try to see if we can identify from the 100 or so initial pool in the venire those for whom

service in the course of the estimated time would not be a problem and see whether we might be able to begin the process with those rather than trying to go through almost all 100 of them one by one and having them make individual determinations as to whether or not they have good reason for not being able to serve for six or seven weeks.

So I offer that as a possibility for you to consider, because if we start with those who do not have a problem serving for the six or seven weeks for whatever reasons, we might be able to much more expeditiously reach a number that we can have as a basis for challenges.

Mr. Weddle, does the government have any views about that possible approach?

MR. WEDDLE: Your Honor, I think it makes sense to address what I would call hardship challenges first, because I think that is going to be the main issue with respect to getting a jury.

I am not sure if your Honor is thinking of addressing that matter in some way other than having people here in the courtroom, but in my experience there is a great benefit to having prospective jurors in the courtroom to talk about whether they can or can't serve, because there are many, many jurors who would much rather not be on a jury. If you simply ask them basically is there going to be any problem for you being on this jury, you get many people selecting themselves

out without any kind of disincentive of having to articulate what their problem is here in the courtroom. And if they can just sort of privately say yes it is going to be a problem for me to sit on that jury, I think it skews the jury pool.

I recognize your Honor's concern with efficiency. It does take a little longer to address the issue here in court, but in every trial I have been in I have had jurors say I really can't do this because I have a doctor's appointment on the afternoon of August 5, and the judge says, Well, OK, why don't I call the doctor and see if you can do it after 5 p.m. or on a different day when we are not sitting, would that suffice? Then the juror says, yes, that would be fine.

You would lose that juror if we didn't do it in Court is the problem that I see.

MR. RYAN: I happen to agree.

THE COURT: I recognize that.

The concern, however, is out of the hundred how many do we have to go through one by one in order to make those determinations. If let's say as an example we ask and let's say 20 out of the hundred initially say no problem, in that case we have 20 to start with and then we can then go through the process to find 12 acceptable ones.

Doing it the other way has the disadvantage of having to go one by one, and we may need to go through 50 in order to get two or three we won't have a problem with or about whom we

would have to make an individual determination, although I do recognize what you are saying.

Yes, Mr. Ryan?

MR. RYAN: I think we are talking about technique.

Our concern and the government's concern rightly is the jurors

can opt out by saying they are not available. There is no

challenge. There is no burden on the juror to explain why they

can't be here. It is the burden of the juror to explain.

My suggestion is, Judge, that you have to address the entire pool, I would suggest, and make this case interesting.

This is a very interesting case. It is a wonderful opportunity for any citizen to learn about railroads, unions, health issues and things of that nature, to evoke an interest in the case.

There are jurors who would, instead of abhorring the opportunity to serve as a juror would find it an opportunity to learn something. I think that is a suggestion I made to the Court in our written submission.

I think if your Honor starts out with the idea that 80 can be knocked out by sitting and not raising their hand 80 out of 100, we have eliminated a lot of jurors that could rightly serve.

THE COURT: Mr. Ryan, I don't think the way you are characterizing it is the way I would envision it.

Out of the hundred there are going to be a certain number who are not going to have a problem serving six weeks or

seven weeks, whatever the number is.

The others may, and the reasons why they may want to try to opt out may or may not be sufficient. But if we have already identified a pool who don't have a problem, then we could limit the process to those who claim to have a problem and then we can go one by one and deal with what they think is sufficient. But the question is whether we can identify a core who say from the start we don't have a problem serving six or seven weeks.

MR. RYAN: Your Honor, I would have no objection to that if it is not a blanket invitation on an abstract premise that 80 percent do not raise their hand and they are out of the case. It is just a question of how it's presented to the jury. I understand your Honor's objective. The question is how to get there.

If we do it in the beginning with one general blanket proposition we are going to lose 80 percent of the jurors who otherwise would be qualified and who really do have no good excuse to be excused from this courtroom.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RYAN: I am expressing this, and just to take -- I understand your objective, and I agree with the objective.

Question is how to get there.

THE COURT: Thank you. Yes?

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, we agree with Mr. Ryan on

this. It may take a little more time. This is such a crucial part of the case, I don't want to rush through it for a very minimal time advantage at the very beginning when it is such an important part of the case.

I agree with Mr. Ryan, that an opportunity that presents itself to jurors to opt out, the jurors will take advantage of it even if they don't have a valid hardship excuse. We should see those jurors and hear from them, because that is why they are here.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: Your Honor there may be a middle ground here, which is if your Honor somehow instructs the jury what you are talking about when you say "problem," so it's not just, I don't feel like doing it. Your Honor could, for example, just tell the jury this is what the trial is going to be. It could last as long as six or seven weeks. That may cause a hardship that would preclude certain of you --

THE COURT: Let me stop you there because I think I know where you are going and this is consistent with where I was going. I do not believe that jurors should be just given a free pass without at least some indication of what would be the standard by which the Court would give a pass.

In other words, what is the hardship in the form of a reason why people might be excused and give a general definition so that people can apply that in determining whether

or not they may have a problem.

If they, after being given that standard, say we don't have a problem, then those who have heard the standard and say that they have a problem could then be questioned as we need one by one to determine whether in fact the problem that they claim they have is sufficient.

MR. WEDDLE: I think if your Honor is telling them those things, I think that that would go a long way. I take it your Honor is not going to be releasing those people, so you would just be starting with the people who don't have an affirmative answer on that issue and then we would go back and check people's problems if we get to that point.

THE COURT: Precisely.

MR. WEDDLE: That seems fine to the government, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Any further views from the defense?

Any other issues that we need to deal with before we proceed?

MR. JACKSON: Judge, I know that there is a pending motion to reargue before you, but I just want to be clear on your Honor's decision as it was handed down so that I don't run afoul of it, knowing the parameters of that decision.

Obviously I object. It is implicit, of course, in the argument

that I made in my opposition to the government's motion in

limine that I differ from your Honor's ruling, but I just want to be clear on a couple of things if I might.

The second prong of the argument in the motion in limine dealt with the continuing disability, the recertification. Apparently the issue was whether that issue can come up that the — it dealt with the negligence of RRB. I understand that the negligence of the RRB, Railroad Retirement Board is not at issue here, and that is not something we will be attacking.

However, when it came to the continuing disability review, I think your Honor said that it was irrelevant and that was also something that we would not at liberty to discuss.

I think that issue could be relevant here for another reason. Because there would be a annuitants here who would be testifying, I don't know what they will say, we will have some sense based on the materials presented, but I think that the fact that they recertified themselves, certainly that goes to their knowledge and it goes to them saying that they were disabled and it goes to their belief I guess that they were disabled. And, just as my argument would be they lied to the RRB, they misrepresented things to my client.

So I just want to be clear on whether or not it's permissible for me to cross-examine those annuitants who testify on the continuing disability issue. I have other issues I would like to raise, but that's the first thing I

wanted to be clear about.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: May I just have one moment, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEDDLE:

MR. DURKIN: Judge, before Mr. Weddle begins, we would join in Mr. Jackson's request as well and simply point out one other fact. It may also come up for impeachment purposes.

Several of the annuitants that I believe are going to testify have admitted in their plea allocutions that that was part of their crime. It is not just the original application but also that they have falsified the recertification. So I think it becomes an issue in that regard as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: Your Honor, this is exactly what we moved on, and that is exactly what your Honor has excluded. The motion was primarily a Rule 403 motion. The standard used in this set of continuing disability reviews was a different standard, and to bring it in would tend to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. So that is exactly why we moved to preclude it.

The witnesses are going to be admitting that they lied to the RRB in their original applications. They are also going to be admitting that they submitted forms by mail to the RRB in furtherance of the scheme. I think that's what Mr. Durkin is

referring to. There are forms, I think they are called G254A, continuing disability update forms or something like that.

That's totally different from what we moved on. Those documents correspond to certain overt acts in the indictment and to substantive counts. Defendant Rutigliano is charged with making a false statement on one of those forms, namely, saying that he was not working when or had not worked when he was.

nothing to do with the continuing disability reviews that we moved on. I think, because this was a Rule 403 exclusion based on confusion of the issues and misleading the jury and wasting time, obviously that analysis applies notwithstanding Mr. Jackson's reargument today about other reasons that he would like to bring up the issue.

The witnesses who are going to be testifying as cooperating witnesses are going to admit that they submitted false documents to the RRB, a number of false documents that were false in many ways, and that the documents were prepared by different people, including all three of the defendants here, the medical records prepared by Dr. Lesniewski and other forms prepared by Mr. Rutigliano and Ms. Baran.

So to cross-examine about another form years later in a different context on which they may or may not have made false statements is still going to confuse the issues and

mislead the jury and waste time.

The probative value is minimal, if anything, because they have already will have admitted the false statements that they made, and this really adds nothing to the picture that is of value. It's entirely cumulative and confusing because it is in a different issue.

May I have one more moment, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

Let me see if we can cut this short. Mr. Jackson, to the extent that your argument amounts to is a request for reconsideration of the issue --

MR. JACKSON: It does not.

THE COURT: -- ruled on in the motion in limine, that request is denied. The motion was acted upon. The ruling is what it is. I don't see any basis so far that has been offered that was not already taken into account in the Court's ruling.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, most respectfully, the Court's ruling did not take that into account at all, which is the basis for which I'm bringing it up now. If it did, Judge, in the plain language and text of your ruling, it would be clear, and I wouldn't address it with you.

What I am saying is in the context of the RRB, the Railroad Retirement Board, the government urged this Court not to allow the continuing disability recertification review.

That is fine. However, if an annuitant is testifying they are

going to be saying that they apparently -- I don't know what they will say. But what I am cross-examining them on is the issue upon them recertifying a lie.

So if they misled the RRB and misled them again, clearly that could give some indication that they misled Ms. Baran in the first instance. It goes to their credibility, which your Honor didn't address this at all regarding cross-examination of the annuitants in the motion. It goes to the under lying foundation of what I am saying and what I am urging to this jury.

Just as they misled the Railroad Retirement Board, they misled Ms. Baran, who was merely a consultant. The fact that again years later they themselves indicated to Ms. Baran that they were disabled and indicating again to the Railroad Retirement Board goes to the core issue of them believing themselves to be disabled, submitting an application for disability, asking Ms. Baran to assist them with that application, and then again recertifying that they were disabled.

So the fact that I cannot cross-examine them on that core issue certainly hinders my client's rights and I think confuses the jury even further.

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, Mr. Weddle has just pointed out that these witnesses will have already indicated presumably in their direct that they falsified documents and made other

misrepresentations to the RRB. That will be part of the record that you can cross-examine on. I don't understand what it is that you are going to get beyond what you have said.

MR. JACKSON: It is a lot I'm trying to get, Judge. The fact is these annuitants filled another form out recertifying that they were disabled, just as initially they lied to the RRB, they lied to Ms. Barren they then subsequently lied then by saying they are disabled, but I can't point out to the jury that they lied again. If my indication to the jury is that he initially lied to Ms. Baran and then they went again and lied to the RRB, certainly I should be able to point out that at some later point they again stated they were disabled.

The fact that I'm precluded from doing that I think certainly hinders Ms. Baran's right to get a fair trial, and it goes to the core of their credibility. It has nothing to do with what you ruled on in the motion in limine. It wasn't addressed at all. And I think impedes her greatly. It is unfair, it's prejudicial that I can't point out that this witness who is testifying and whose credibility the government is relying upon has lied yet again and tried to mislead the RRB yet again, just as they misled Ms. Baran in assisting them in the application process.

This is not a reargument, Judge. This is not something that I am seeking to back door in. It wasn't addressed. I believe that I have a legitimate right on

Ms. Baran's behalf to cross-examine witnesses in that regard, and I think your Honor should permit it and allow it, as it's coming in for completely different issue than the government urged that it be precluded in their motion. It goes to the heart of the matter. It goes to the credibility of that witness, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: First of all, your Honor, Mr. Jackson didn't respond to our motion in limine. So actually I think probably to be more precise this isn't a motion for reargument because we moved to preclude any reference to any part of the reviews on Rule 401 and 403 grounds, and he didn't respond.

So these are new arguments that he is making. For the reasons that I said earlier, they are meritless. This is a Rule 403 exclusion, which means that the prejudice in the form of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, wasting time outweighs any probative value.

This particular form filled out let's say in 2010 really is, if it has any probative value about a person telling a lie in 2010, it's so minimal as to be clearly precludable under Rule 403.

The people will have submitted forms to the RRB. They will admit on the stand that those forms were false. Those forms have legends on them saying that they have to be filled out truthfully, that failing to do so is punishable as a crime.

So everything that he's trying to do is covered. What he's trying to do with this additional form is cumulative of the cross-examination that he's already going to have and is going to cross great prejudice for the reasons stated in our brief that your Honor has ruled on that he didn't respond to.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, I just want to correct something.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JACKSON: Regarding me not responding, number one, I did respond to what I thought in the motion in limine in fact affected Ms. Baran. Number two, to be clear the continuing disability review was not responded to because they were arguing it should be precluded in light of this argument that we were going to raise about the negligence of the RRB and the RRB not detecting this fraud.

I am not arguing that the RRB was negligent. So the continuing disability review in terms of how the government sought to preclude it didn't relate, and I didn't care because I'm not arguing the point about the RRB being negligent.

But in the context of your order, Judge, where you seem to exclude for all purposes the whole continuing disability issue, I just think it becomes problematic and it is something that this Court needs to reconsider.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I have considered it and I have considered it again,

Mr. Jackson. I have ruled on it. I don't see anything new in what you are saying. The government is right. This is a 403 issue. The question that you are raising is cumulative. If the witness says on the stand I lied five times, I don't think that it's material that he lied six times. You will have plenty of opportunity to drag out as much as possible the fact that the witness lied five times.

I don't see that there is any merit in bringing in possibly confusing and cumulative issues with yet another document to establish the same point. The witness lied. You don't need to hammer the jury with the same issue over and over and over. If the witness' credibility has been challenged by five different lies, then the sixth one is not going to make that much difference. But bringing it in a new document, new context, for other reasons the Court views as unnecessary.

MR. JACKSON: Judge, most respectfully isn't that a jury question? Shouldn't the jury be allowed to assess credibility?

THE COURT: This is a Court question the. Question of being able to assess credibility for different reasons, for different purposes, the determination of whether something is cumulative and relevant is not a jury issue. I have ruled on the matter. Let's move on.

Yes?

MR. JACKSON: I have more, Judge, unless this is about

the same issue.

THE COURT: If it's about the same issue I don't want to hear it. Mr. Durkin.

MR. DURKIN: I was only going to be ask that we be permitted to join in Mr. Jackson's comments. I did want to address just one issue which is more than just this issue.

The government has several times now mentioned time, wasting time. There is a real easy way to cut down the time of this trial, and that is them limiting their evidence with respect to Dr. Ajemian and everything else that they are trying to do.

I just don't think that it's fair that we should bear the brunt of the waste-of-time argument when it comes to cross-examination. We also asked earlier — and I was going to raise this and I don't want this to be argumentative — but we filed a motion that said if we can't be assured that we could put our defense on in the time allotted, we wanted to seek a continuance.

I don't want a continuance. I have said that we are prepared to go to trial. But I am very concerned about the amount of evidence the government is going to try to put in, which I think if you want to talk about cumulative or unnecessary, it is unnecessarily prejudicial to our client, all this Ajemian evidence. I just want the record to be clear that we are concerned that we are not going to have time to put our

case in, and I don't think that our cross-examination choices should be precluded simply as a waste-of-time issue. That is a far cry from 4303 prejudice.

THE COURT: Two answers to your concern, Mr. Durkin.

One is nobody is precluding anything. That is an incorrect characterization. The issue is not preclusion. The issue is how much is enough and whether at some point it becomes irrelevant, immaterial, and cumulative. That's what the issue is, not whether or not you can cross-examine a witness as to how many lies a witness may have said.

I repeat if you can cross-examine the witness as to five lies, cross-examining as to the sixth lie becomes cumulative, unnecessary, and wasteful, especially if it requires the introduction of another document that is not yet in the case and which the Court has ruled not material for other reasons.

Second, with respect to the government's case, the Court is very aware of the questions of time limitations and the issue of cumulativeness. At any point at which it appears to the Court that the government's presentation of its case is cumulative, either by documentation or by number of witnesses, we will deal with that issue at that time. This Court has on numerous prior occasions in other trials made the government aware that its case was cumulative and so ruled.

MR. DURKIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else?

Mr. Jackson, you said you have other issues.

MR. JACKSON: I do. Judge, regarding the statement issue, I believe that your ruling pretty much allowed the government to take six assertions that Ms. Baran made, and the other 42 assertions, to preclude those saying that, I guess the Court was reasoning that the government would be allowed to cherry pick statements that Ms. Baran made and that wouldn't offend the rule of completeness or fairness. I just want to address that so I am absolutely clear.

The fact is, is that there was an interview conducted of Ms. Baran, and if you parse out the totality of what Ms. Baran said, there could be about 50 separate assertions, depending upon how you parse out what she said.

I listed in my memorandum about 46, but I believe the government is saying that it's only the six statements that the government unilaterally determined to be of interest and relevant and necessary that this jury should hear. I believe that was your ruling.

The other ones, although taken out of context and completely not in proportion to what she was saying, I can't use. In the event that the witness takes the stand, Judge, and is testifying regarding certain comments that Ms. Baran made and I am looking at her statement and they are lifting

my objection, your Honor, when I do object, and I will review my application at that time. But your Honor is not saying that when that witness testifies that if they lift something out of a statement taken out of context that I can't cross-examine them upon it. Is that what your Honor is saying?

THE COURT: I am not saying that you cannot cross-examine if cross-examination is appropriate an whatever the issue in the statement is.

MR. JACKSON: OK.

THE COURT: The question is whether you can come and try to offer another statement from Ms. Baran that you think completes the context which in the Court's view does not complete the context and may be objectionable for other reasons.

MR. JACKSON: That's part of the cross-examination. In other words, Judge, in the event that the witness testifies to a statement that was made by Ms. Baran, and that is something lifted wholesale prior to what she said before or immediately following something, I would like -- and I guess the Court just said I could -- to question that witness about whether or not she said what she said to put it in context for the jury so as not to mislead the jury, so as not to confuse the jury, so as not to deny Ms. Baran the right to a fair trial. I will reserve for when that happens, but I just want

to be absolutely clear as to your ruling. You are not saying that I cannot cross-examine on those portions, is that right?

THE COURT: You cannot cross-examine on portions that do not satisfy the standards for completeness. If a witness testifies that Ms. Baran asked them to make statements in the forms that were not truthful, and in the next statement Ms. Baran said the sky is blue, the sky is blue has nothing to do with the statement that the witness is testifying to. That would not meet the standard of completeness.

MR. JACKSON: I completely agree, Judge. But in the event that they do say something and it is out of context, certainly I'm allowed then, Judge, to cross-examine, and we can deal with it at that time, is that correct?

MR. WEDDLE: Your Honor -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: We will have to make a determination whether or not it is out of context.

MR. JACKSON: OK.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: A couple of things, your Honor. This is the reason why we made this motion, and I think your Honor has ruled on the motion.

I don't think that we should reargue every motion over and over again. Our view is that, given your Honor's ruling on the motion, Mr. Jackson should not articulate the substance of any other statement reflected in that memo in cross-examining

the witness.

So in your Honor's example, it is not OK, given your Honor's ruling, that the sky is blue, is not subject to the rule of completeness, not admissible if offered by Mr. Jackson, it is not OK for him to say to a witness, Isn't it true, Special Agent, that my client said the sky is blue? That is in violation of your Honor's ruling, and we would strongly object to that. It is simply an effort to get material before the jury that your Honor has ruled to be inadmissible. That is our view.

Obviously I have met with the witness. I am going to continue to work on my questions and answers. But my questions are going to be highly targeted, and they are going to elicit as best I can simply the pieces that we have put out in our motion.

It is not going to be a wide ranging discussion of all the things that Marie Baran said, and it's not going to be purport to be all the things that Marie Baran said, it is going to be what did she say with respect to this narrow topic and the witness is going to say, I believe, the things we set forth in our motion.

I don't believe it's consistent with your Honor's ruling on this matter for Mr. Jackson to then be asking questions about other things that Marie Baran said.

MR. JACKSON: I agree. However, my cross-examination

will be targeted also, and to the extent that the government's question elicits something out of context in the statement that was made, I certainly believe I would be permitted --

THE COURT: Mr. Jackson, the government has already flagged for you what those statements are. Presumably they are six statements?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, they are in the motion.

THE COURT: They are in their motion.

So whether or not they are out of context, you know what they are now.

MR. JACKSON: I do.

THE COURT: So if you feel that any of those are out of context, you have the opportunity during the motion in limine to point that out.

MR. JACKSON: I did, Judge.

THE COURT: I disagreed with you.

MR. JACKSON: I didn't think the disagreement, most respectfully, Judge, was not targeted. I gave the Court 46 various statements that Ms. Baran made. I just got pretty much a blanket response that didn't address the various statements. The reality, Judge, is that the government is taking it out of context. It offends the rule of completeness. It's totally misleading to the jury, it's completely prejudicial, and it's unfair and the Court did not rule on the specific statements that I made with regard to them being out of context at all.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Jackson.

MR. WEDDLE: Your Honor, may I suggest a method of proceeding in this matter. Obviously Mr. Jackson is an excellent lawyer, and he briefed the matter the way that he did for the reasons that he did. That was a choice that he decided to make strategically. Your Honor has ruled on the motion. To the extent he thinks that something that happens on direct examination opens the door to a particular question that articulates the substance of something that Marie Baran said, I suggest that he first preview that at sidebar and then your Honor can rule on it rather than just throwing out material in front of the jury in a manner that your Honor has already ruled is not admissible.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Jackson, that is the proper way to address the issue, and that is the way that this Court typically handles issues such as you've raised.

Anything else?

Mr. Ryan.

MR. RYAN: Is your Honor going to rule on the golf evidence issue?

THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Ryan, I have looked at your motion. We discussed this at the conference on the telephone on Friday. I believe the evidence is relevant and I will not preclude it.

To the extent you take issue with the whether or not the government expert physician could opine as to your client's ability to play golf as he did in light of the disabilities that he claimed, the way that that might have been handled is for you to come forward with an equally qualified expert who would testify that indeed your client could play golf in light of the claimed disability, but that is not at issue at this point.

Anything else?

All right. Let's check to see what the status of the jury pool is at this point.

Mr. Weddle, the issue concerning the summary of the charges, did you work that out?

MR. WEDDLE: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: We are going to need that very early on in the voir dire?

MR. WEDDLE: I am not sure what your Honor is planning to use, but the introduction that is in the government's proposed voir dire about the nature of the charges doesn't list any count numbers, so I think that's fine.

I was thinking if your Honor is planning to say there is an indictment in the case, and the indictment charges generally this, I would just propose that we omit count numbers. But in looking at what the government proposed as the explanation of the charges, it's simply one paragraph, and it

doesn't have count numbers. So I don't think it raises the issue at all. But I can draft something different if your Honor would like something else. THE COURT: If you have that summary and it is acceptable to the defendants, we can use that. The pool will be about ten minutes, perhaps we can take a break for ten minutes. (Recess) (Continued with jury voir dire in next volume)